Israel - A Brief Discussion

“Arabs and Israelis each have a narrative that tells their story and interprets their reality, and these narratives were lurking in every discussion. To understand these narratives, one needs to know what shaped them; how they evolved; and how particular historical developments affected attitudes and beliefs. Only then can one appreciate what we had to contend with in trying to promote peacemaking” – Dennis Ross

This is a brief discussion of the history of the modern state of Israel, the political and psychological background of the conflict, security, and finally my recommendations to the Obama Administration.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The United States cannot base its policy off of recent events; however, the Obama Administration should consider the history of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as it relates to a potential peace agreement. Although recent developments should involve condemnation of rocket attacks, including an anti-tank rocket being fired upon a school bus (http://www.jpost.com/VideoArticles/20Questions/Article.aspx?id=215679) and current events including the Hamas/Fatah unity government, my discussion begins in the early 20th century since I believe that is the best starting point for any discussion on the current peace process.

In 1917, Lord Balfour of Great Britain wrote that the Jews should have a Jewish state within Palestine. This was the first significant declaration by a global power recommending a Jewish state within the territory of modern day Israel. It was even more significant given this region was under Great Britain’s and therefore Lord Balfour’s authority. The letter says: “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”(Yale Law School, 2011)

Thirty years later, the Arabs refused to entertain the idea of a two state solution and refused to honor the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. The Jews lobbied the U.N. for partition, the Arabs threatened violence if it passed, and they walked out after it did pass saying the U.N. was “murdered” as reported in the New York Times on November 30, 1947 titled “Assembly Votes Palestine Partition; Margin is 33 to 13; Arabs Walk Out; Aranha Hails Work as Session Ends.” The Times also reported on September 29, 1947 the Arabs were opposed to the Partition plan in the piece titled “U.N. to Hear Arab’ ‘Three Noes’ On Palestine Inquiry Report Today” which says that the Arabs three No’s were - “no partition, no further Jewish immigration, and no Jewish state.” Now, the Palestinians have a unity government that, as you know, includes Hamas who has three no's of their own - no to renunciation of violence, no to recognizing Israel and no to recognizing past Palestinian agreements. 

Six months later on May 14, 1948, Israel declared its independence. On the first day of Israel’s statehood, five separate Arab countries invaded the infant state of Israel. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria all combined forces to drive out the newly formed Jewish state. During this war, many Arab residents of present day Israel fled from their homes for various reasons. In many cities, Arab leaders told their Arab residents to leave their homes and promised in a short time they could return (http://www.jewishfederations.org/page.aspx?id=121275).

Israel Defence Force (IDF) soldiers forced some Arabs to leave their homes for strategic reasons and the IDF relocated them – most of these Arabs lived on the coastal areas. In the five attacking Arab countries, a shift in population also occurred. These Arab countries forced between 300,000 to 800,000 Jews to leave their homes, while roughly the same number of Arabs (Palestinians) left present day Israel (http://www.meforum.org/2875/how-many-palestinian-arab-refugees).

Israel absorbed these Jewish immigrants while the Palestinians continue to inhabit refugee camps where they continue to this day. Currently, 4 to 5 million Palestinian refugees live in these refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan and Lebanon.

In 1967, Israel once again fought a coalition of Arab states. On May 18, Syria put their troops on Israel’s northern border. On May 22 Egypt closed the straits of Tehran to all Israeli shipping, stopping the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran. On May 30, 1967, Nasser said Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon waited on the borders of Israel ready to fight with the armies of Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Sudan and the whole Arab nation behind them. On June 4, Iraq joined the coalition. On June 5, Israel gave an order to attack Egypt. By the end of the day, Israel had destroyed the entire Egyptian and Jordanian air forces and half of Syria’s air force on the ground. Tank battles ensued, with Syria on the northern border and Egypt and Jordan on its eastern and southern borders. More than 325,000 Palestinians fled Israel, causing an already bad refugee situation to become even worse. At this time, Israel’s size went from 8,000 square miles to 26,000 square miles (Oren, 2002). Arab and Palestinian leaders want Israel to go back to the June 4th border of 8,000 square miles in order to conduct a peace treaty with Israel, which are not defensible borders.

Nearly thirty years later in 1993, the United States helped arrange a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Palestinian territories were to be divided into three areas designated as A, B and C. In time, the Palestinians were to receive full governance over all of these areas, once they had demonstrated the capability to provide security for Israel and demonstrate the capability to stem terrorist activity. The Palestinians were either incapable or unwilling to pursue such requirements; therefore, the agreement became null and void. Many Israelis and Palestinians view this particular peace process known as the Oslo Accords or the “Declaration of Principles” as a complete failure. (Ross, 2004)

Two years later in 1995, Yitzhak Rabin, the then Israeli prime minister was intent on making peace with the Palestinians, however he was assassinated by an orthodox Jewish student for giving away that land the student felt belonged to Israel. Rabin was Israel’s negotiator during the Oslo Accords, and it was that failed process which gave official recognition to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. (Ross, 2004)

Then in 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak conceded more than any previous Israeli Prime Minister in an effort to seek Final Status Negotiations, which if accepted would have meant the Palestinians could no longer go back to the negotiating table to ask for more once they accepted these Final Status negotiations. His offer included all of the Gaza Strip, ninety-seven percent of the West Bank with a three percent territorial swap, East Jerusalem as a capitol for the Palestinians, financial compensation for refugees and a certain number of refugee repatriation. This offer was more than most Israelis were able to accept, yet because the deal had Final Status Negotiations attached to it, most Israelis went along with the proposal. The result would have meant a lasting settlement in the dispute with Israel. Ultimately, the Palestinian leadership never accepted the proposal (Ross, 2004).

In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, declaring the area a demographic nightmare and a security issue pertaining to Israeli settlements in the midst of 1.2 million Palestinians (http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/gazareturn.html). As a result of this withdrawal, Hamas, which previously had only won municipal elections, won a national election, claiming credit for the Israeli withdrawal. Hamas based its platform on three issues: non-recognition of Israel; the refusal to recognize prior Palestinian agreements; the refusal to renounce violence, a platform they hold to this day.

Hamas had one principal Arab competitor for votes. That competitor was Fatah, and the political party of Yasir Arafat. Fatah habitually gave money and favors to friends and allies, leaving the average Palestinian to survive without assistance. Hamas provided social services to the Palestinian people similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and capitalized on that corrupt perception of Fatah. It was for this reason Hamas was viewed by average Palestinians as having their best interest at heart. (Conan, 2005)

This compressed view of historical hostilities between Israel and its neighbors shows that Israel’s compliance with U.N. Resolution 425 in 2000 and its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 have done little to create an atmosphere of conciliation. Instead of reciprocating, Hamas and the Hezbollah actually increased the level of violence against Israel with Hezbollah increasing the amount of rocket attacks into Israel’s northern territory, border attacks and Hamas immediately attacking Israel by way of the Gaza Strip. Since Israel’s unilateral withdrawals have not achieved any desired compromises between the two, I would like to consider other options.

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Peace between Israel and individual Arab countries is complex. With the exception of Egypt and Jordan, Arab countries have yet to come to any peace agreement with Israel, claiming that peace is impossible unless the Palestinians have their own independent state (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1844214.stm). And now that former President Hosni Mubarak has stepped down as President of Egypt and with Egyptian elections, it is very likely the Muslim Brotherhood will take over which would discontinue the cold peace it has had with Israel since 1979.

Additionally, conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon have always been deplorable. In certain refugee camps the government of Lebanon denies permission to Palestinians to complete even the most basic tasks, such as carrying in wood to build a home in addition to owning property. Lebanon currently has an estimated 400,000 Palestinians living in refugee camps run by the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (http://refugees.resist.ca/document/situationlebanon.htm).

According to the Coalition Against the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees and the above link, the Palestinians in Lebanon are denied basic human rights due to their involvement in the Lebanese civil war. The PLO tried to take over south Lebanon and tried to make it a state back in the 1970’s. The Lebanese feel threatened by a Palestinian takeover and therefore, withhold trust and help from Palestinian refugees. Only one percent of Palestinians in Lebanon have secured the permanent right to work permit and are therefore forced to work illegally, in mostly unskilled labor positions with 60 percent of Palestinians living under the poverty line and the largest refugee camp with 80 percent unemployment (http://refugees.resist.ca/document/situationlebanon.htm).

Palestinian refugees live primarily in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Israel is a democracy. Israel currently has 7.7 million citizens with a three quarters Jewish population and a sizeable Israeli Arab population within the other nearly two million citizens. Thus, with the Arab minority making up 20.5 percent of this population (http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.87f92331f5590644918892e6b8a58f1f.4e1&show_article=1), if Israel added five million Palestinians into the state of Israel, a Jewish majority would no longer exist and given the birth rates, Israel could lose its Jewish majority up in a generation or two. The Palestinians leadership realizes this, and has since done everything they can to include the right of return in peace proposals, which Israeli leaders see as nothing more than an attempt to destroy the Jewish nature of Israel. If Palestinians truly want peace, they must give up the right of return as no Israeli prime minister would assent to this proposal, and the United State’s foreign policy cannot move forward with any discussion of a right of return.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
There is also a psychological barrier that any U.S. president must consider when acting as a mediator between the Israelis and Palestinians. The late Anwar Sadat, formerly President of Egypt (United Arab Republic) has noted the psychological obstacles to overcome and the assassinations of many Arab leaders (noted below) who have made peace with Israel speak to the very real concerns any Arab leader must settle before even considering peace with Israel. In 1977, Sadat flew to Jerusalem to speak at the Israeli Knesset (Address of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Knesset, November 20, 1977).

He proposed accepting a peace deal with the Israelis which would be costly to the Israelis and he argued to Egypt. For Sadat’s efforts, he paid the ultimate price –he was assassinated. Sadat came to the conclusion that before he passed that the Palestinians refused to accept peace with Israel on psychological grounds rather than on an assessment of beneficial outcomes. He believed the problem had to do with the perception of winning and losing rather than with securing a peaceful future.
“Yet, there remained another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us. A barrier of suspicion. A barrier of rejection. A barrier of fear of deception. A barrier of hallucinations around any action, deed or decision. A barrier of cautious and erroneous interpretations of all and every event or statement. It is this psychological barrier which I described in official statements as representing 70 percent of the whole problem..” (Address of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Knesset, November 20, 1977)

If this perception is correct and nothing has changed, no matter how many concessions Israel offers, the Palestinians would reject peace proposal.

Fear of assassination is a major incentive not to make peace with Israel and therefore creates a barrier to overcoming the psychological hurdles as described by Sadat. Most Arab leaders who make peace with Israel have historically paid for it with their lives or ouster, making any current peace process all the more formidable. Syrian leader Husni Za’im offered to resettle 300,000 refugees in exchange for half of the sea of Galilee. He was six months in power before being overthrown and executed. Abdallah of Jordan wanted a corridor between his newly annexed West Bank and the Mediterranean in 1951. July of that year, a Palestinian shot and killed him outside Jerusalem’s Al Aqsa mosque. Iraq’s king Faisal along with his Prime Minister Nuri Al-Sa’id who had secretly contacted the Israelis were dismembered by a Baghdad mob in 1958. Egypt’s King Faruq wanted to wrest the entire Negev desert from Israel. In 1952, he was ousted by General Muhammad Naguib, who, within a year was deposed by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Egyptian emissaries said an agreement with the Zionists now or even in the future would cost them their lives. (Oren, 2002, p.7). Later, Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat, the only Arab leader to address Israel’s government, the Knesset, made peace with Israel and was eventually assassinated. This is the background that any Arab leader must consider before even considering peace with Israel in addition to practical conerns including security and settlements.

SECURITY
Alpher (1994) claimed that security concerns to Israel are of utmost importance. He discussed the need for security as being necessary in a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors. The literature suggests Israel must have security or the perception of security if it is to consider a peace proposal. Security seems to have a higher value to Israelis than to Palestinians or to other Arab countries. Israel has repeatedly pursued a peace accord with the Palestinians, but Israelis are less willing to pursue a peace proposal when they doubt the willingness of the Arabs as peace partners. Many Israeli residents are currently under psychiatric care due to the continuous stress the last eight years of attacks (Gedalyahu, 2009). Hamas rocket attacks will play a role in the Israeli response to Hamas leadership. Israel will be forced to protect its citizens and of necessity must target Hamas leadership for removal. Because many Arab states balk at recognizing Israel as a state, Israel has been forced to focus primarily upon assurances of security. Other issues such as economic or cultural aspects are secondary in comparison to security. Despite the great financial cost to the country of Israel, security is paramount.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
If a peace proposal is to work and the Israelis are to give up settlements, absorb a certain amount of Palestinian refugees, accept east Jerusalem as the capitol of Palestine, go back to the pre-67 borders, and ultimately accept a Palestinian state, then the Palestinians must forever and unequivocally renounce terrorism, give up the right of return (except for those refugees agreed upon by Israel), arrest terrorists within their own borders, change their school textbooks to include the state of Israel, recognize Israel’s Jewish nature (as Israel accepts the nature of Muslim countries), and enter into Final Status negotiations.

If both parties agree to the above after they sign a peace agreement, then the Palestinians cannot come back to the negotiating table and demand more from the Israelis. They must realize they are now responsible for ensuring peace within their own borders and good governance by providing for their citizens through security, education, transportation, health care, and any other normal and appropriate responsibilities placed upon governments.

Historically, the surrounding Arab countries have used the Palestinian/Israeli conflict to avoid normalized relations with Israel. The Arab world points to Israel as the principle source for the majority of conflicts in the Middle East. Israel is, in most cases, thousands of miles away from the countries in question, yet those far off countries cite the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict in some cases to avoid resolving their internal disputes and other states who have disputes with other Arab countries. If the Israeli/Palestinian conflict resolved successfully, the rest of the countries in the Arab/Muslim world would no longer have any external excuses and would be obligated to resolve their difficulties with one another.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- If you are going to urge a settlement freeze or discuss borders, do so privately and certainly not as a precondition for any talks between Israelis and Palestinians
- Do not hold any media briefings or public photo ops while negotiations are ongoing as this only allows those opposed to peace in the Israeli and Palestinian ranks to use it as propaganda to abort any potential peace process
- Please don’t send Joe Biden back to Israel on behalf of the U.S. government since he cannot seem to satisfy either party but instead send someone who is well received and respected by both parties. Someone like former U.S. envoy Dennis Ross would be a huge step forward given his familiarity with the issues, his relationships with both Israelis and Palestinians and his perception as an honest broker by leadership in both parties
- You’ll have to take a hands off approach publicly, but can pursue incentives with Israel privately
- Do all you can to minimize the influence of Hamas and seek to remove them from any areas of influence as they are only a hindrance to the process. With the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the influence of Hamas can only be worse for any potential peace process
- At some point you will have to address Jerusalem, security, refugees, borders and settlements which should lead to Final Status negotiations

References

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